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Abstract
Based on an entirely unexplored source of data, this paper analyses the evo-
lution of Tibetan representation and preferentiality within public employ-
ment recruitment across all Tibetan areas from 2007 to 2015. While
recruitment collapsed after the end of the job placement system ( fenpei) in
the early to mid-2000s, there was a strong increase in public employment
recruitment from 2011 onwards. Tibetans were underrepresented within
this increase, although not severely, and various implicit practices of prefer-
entiality bolstered such representation, with distinct variations across regions
and time. The combination reasserted the predominant role of the state as
employer of educated millennials in Tibetan areas to the extent of re-intro-
ducing employment guarantees. We refer to this as the innovation of a neo-
fenpei system. This new system is most clearly observed in the Tibet
Autonomous Region (TAR) from 2011 to 2016, although it appears to
have been abandoned in 2017. One effect of neo-fenpei, in contrast to its pre-
decessor, is that it accentuates university education as a driver of differenti-
ation within emerging urban employment. The evolution of these
recruitment practices reflects the complex tensions in Tibetan areas regard-
ing the overarching goal of security and social stability (weiwen) emphasized
by the Xi–Li administration, which has maintained systems of minority pre-
ferentiality but in a manner that enhances assimilationist trends rather than
minority group empowerment.
Keywords: Tibet; China; public employment recruitment and reforms;
minzu (ethnic) representation; preferential policies
Graduate employment is a heated politicized issue throughout China but particu-
larly so in Tibetan areas given the severe disadvantages faced by Tibetans when
competing for such employment. In particular, jobs that are deemed appropriate
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for university graduates are biased, through their recruitment processes, towards
those who possess stronger Chinese language skills and related cultural aptitudes.
While this might benefit a minority of Sinicized Tibetans or other ethnic mino-
rities in Tibetan areas, in addition to the Han Chinese majority, it disadvantages
the majority of Tibetan graduates with weaker Chinese language skills, who also
have to contend with a range of other discriminatory practices.
Two contradictory dynamics have lead to mounting pressure since the early
2000s. Rising educational attainment among Tibetans, especially in tertiary edu-
cation, has increased the demand for public employment, in particular because of
the exceptionally limited supply of formal private employment in Tibetan areas
that would correspond to the employment expectations of tertiary graduates.
The even more rapid expansion of Tibetan-medium education in the Tibetan
areas outside of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), as analysed in detail by
Adrian Zenz,1 has accentuated this pressure for public employment as there is lit-
tle desire for such education from even state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
In contrast, the phasing out of the erstwhile job assignment system ( fenpei 分
配), from the late 1990s onwards, worked against these rising attainments and
expectations. This legacy of the collective and early reform eras effectively served
as an implicit preferential employment policy in minority areas as it guaranteed
employment to secondary vocational and university graduates, regardless of
minzu民族 (officially translated as “nationality” and unofficially often as “ethni-
city”).2 As discussed by Zenz,3 the fenpei system also supported Tibetan-medium
schooling in that employment was guaranteed to graduates regardless of the lan-
guage medium or subject of their studies. It thereby allowed for several genera-
tions of a small but growing cohort of university-educated Tibetans to embed
themselves within various state institutions.4 Although implicit, the fenpei system
was arguably the most important form of positive discrimination practised in
Tibetan areas because it guaranteed outcomes in coveted public employment.
The end of fenpei was part of the broader state-sector employment reforms that
began in eastern China earlier in the 1990s and reached the Tibetan areas from the
late 1990s onwards.5 The TAR was the last region to abolish fenpei, which was fina-
lized in 2007.6 The end of fenpei was compounded by the more general retrench-
ment and restructuring of state-sector employment in the late 1990s and early
2000s. As a result, one of the most substantive pillars of positive discrimination
was removed precisely at a time when demand for preferentiality was increasing.
1 Zenz 2013; 2017.
2 The translation of minzu as “ethnicity” is problematic, although space does not permit further explan-
ation here.
3 Zenz 2013.
4 For instance, see Costello 2002; Robin 2010.
5 Fischer 2005; 2009; 2014; Zenz, 2013.
6 For instance, see “Xizang cheng zuihou yige gaobie daxue biyesheng jihua fenpei de shengfen” (The
TAR accomplishes its final farewell to the provincial graduate student’s job assignment system),
Xinhua, 27 November 2006, http://news.xinhuanet.com/employment/2006-11/27/content_5394400.htm.
Accessed 5 January 2016.
2 The China Quarterly, pp. 1–25
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741017001710
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 80.200.187.247, on 03 Jan 2018 at 12:06:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
Explicit and implicit preferential employment practices nonetheless outlived
the job assignment system. The explicit forms are in relation to the general system
of preferential policies for ethnic minorities (youhui zhengce 优惠政策), which
range from family planning to school admission, and include preferential points
in job applications. Implicit practices include specifying certain language skills or
even Tibetan-medium degree qualifications, as well as local residency require-
ments, in public employment recruitment. Language requirements are technically
permitted under Article 49 of China’s Regional Nationality Autonomy Law
(minzu quyu zizhifa 民族区域自治法), which stipulates that cadres in minority
regions should have knowledge of the respective minority language. This lends
minorities an advantage when competing for such positions. Specifying local resi-
dency requirements similarly restricts competition from (mostly non-Tibetan)
outsiders. Even beyond these practices, Tibetans might make up the bulk of
more general hiring, particularly in remote areas populated largely by Tibetan
majorities, which are seen as undesirable by non-local applicants, or else where
informal practices of clientelism or nepotism tend to prevail in the recruitment
process.7 Language or residency requirements, however, are currently the most
decisive formal means of exercising preferentiality in public employment, particu-
larly as the specification of minzu status appears rarely in the recruitment criteria
used in Tibetan areas.
Attempts to analyse practices of preferentiality have, however, been hampered
by a dearth of any rigorous or systematic information on the extent of these post-
fenpei practices or outcomes in Tibetan areas (or other minority areas of China).
Moreover, the phasing out of fenpei led to a period of ambiguity and uncertainty in
the public employment systems in Tibetan areas. A strong assimilationist policy
orientation appeared to be in the ascendant. This was buffered by growing criticism
of minority nationality policy in China by advocates of a second generation of eth-
nic policies (SGEPs). They argued that as well as reinforcing minority nationalism,
preferentiality targeted towards minority groups was unfair to socio-economically
weaker members of both the Han majority and the minority groups, and hence, it
should be replaced by preferentiality based on socio-economic criteria.8 As argued
by Andrew Fischer,9 the perception of this assimilationist orientation contributed
to the political resentment that fuelled widespread protests throughout Tibetan
areas in 2008 and after.
The main impediment to verifying this perception has been the lack of public
employment data disaggregated according to minzu status, which have been non-
existent in publicly available statistical sources since the early 2000s. The TAR
provided state-owned unit staff and worker data disaggregated by Tibetans
and non-Tibetans up until 2003,10 although similar disaggregations are not
7 On corruption, see Zenz 2013, Ch. 5.
8 For instance, see Ma 2007. For surveys of these debates, see Leibold 2013 and Sautman 2012. Also, see
some discussion of this position in the conclusion of Fischer 2014.
9 Fischer 2009; 2012; 2014.
10 Tibet Bureau of Statistics 2004.
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publicly available for other provinces containing Tibetan areas.11 Drawing from
these data, Fischer observed a sharp reduction in Tibetan representation in 2002–
2003.12 In particular, the Tibetan share of cadre employment fell from over 70
per cent up to 2002 to just below 50 per cent in 2003, the lowest level since
1980. Since then, only anecdotal evidence or indirect extrapolations exist to sug-
gest that the trends might have continued further into the noughties.13
More recent policy developments appear to have altered the situation dramat-
ically since the 2008 protests. Most notable is the major policy change launched
at the Eighth TAR Party Congress in November 2011, when the then-new TAR
Party secretary Chen Quanguo 陈全国 announced the aim of achieving “full
employment” (quan jiuye 全就业) for all tertiary graduates who “originate”
(shengyuan 生源) from the TAR.14 This new policy thereby effectively reintro-
duced a form of job guarantee and could be termed a neo-fenpei system. The ini-
tiative might be understood as a measure to promote socio-political stability by
using state resources to remedy major sources of grievance, as has been increas-
ingly characteristic in the shift from the Hu–Wen to the Xi–Li administration.15
The focus is evidently on co-opting a rising strata of university-educated young
Tibetans through the promise of lucrative public sector jobs, particularly since
the period of retrenchment in public sector employment that preceded the
wave of protests in 2008. Chen’s announcement also came just months after
the beginning of the first spate of self-immolations by Tibetans in the Tibetan
areas of neighbouring Sichuan province.16 To the best of our knowledge, how-
ever, these policy developments have been completely absent from the social sci-
ence scholarship on Tibet outside of China and they have barely registered in the
scholarship inside China.
This article aims to address these lacunas by exploiting a new and entirely
unexplored data source on public employment recruitment that has been avail-
able in digital online form starting from about 2006 onwards. These data contain
specifications such as minority language capability, university degree and/or resi-
dency requirements. The actual recruitment outcomes (or else intermediate short-
lists of candidates) have also been published, although with highly uneven
consistency and comprehensiveness. The publishing of detailed recruitment
advertisements and outcomes appears to be part of a wider effort to combat
11 The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region yearbooks also provided a disaggregation of staff and
worker employment by minority and non-minority minzu status up until the 2003 yearbook. See
Fischer 2013.
12 Fischer 2005, 115.
13 For example, Fischer 2014, 234–35.
14 See Xiao, Duan and Gao 2012.
15 For instance, see Yang 2016 for some discussion of this in relation to China more generally. Also, see
Fischer 2015 for a discussion of the evolution of subsidies towards the TAR up to the end of the Hu–
Wen administration.
16 See the special issue of Cultural Anthropology, e.g. McGranahan and Litzinger 2012. Also see Barnett
2012.
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corruption in public recruitment processes through increased transparency.17 It
offers a unique opportunity to explore the evolution of formal practices of
preferentiality in recruitment as well as the extent of minzu representation in
recruitment outcomes. The documents do not indicate the extent of minzu
representation in the stock of existing employment, nor the minzu composition
of retirements, lay-offs or out-of-province transfers, which are especially import-
ant in light of the substantial retrenchment and restructuring of state-sector
employment in the early 2000s. Nonetheless, they provide a far more substan-
tiated understanding of current conditions than exists to date even in the
Chinese literature.
Several major insights can be made from scrutinizing these data. These include
chronic but not severe Tibetan underrepresentation within public recruitment;
strong increases in recruitment levels from 2011 onwards; and the generalized
decline in the use of language requirements (except in Amdo Qinghai) versus a
sustained use of residency requirements, particularly in the TAR. These insights
are discussed in the following sections. The first provides a brief overview of the
urban employment situation in the Tibetan areas. Second, the new data sources
are presented, along with an explanation of employment categories and recruit-
ment processes. The recruitment outcomes are discussed in the third section, fol-
lowed by an analysis of the more comprehensive recruitment advertisement data
in the fourth section. The conclusion relates these findings to changing dynamics
of social inequality, to ongoing debates surrounding SGEP, and to questions of
affirmative action more generally.
Overview of the Urban Employment Situation in the Tibetan Areas
A key aspect of the employment predicament in Tibetan areas is that the state sector
has remained as the almost exclusive source of jobs appropriate for university grad-
uates. This situation has persisted despite dramatic changes in the structure of urban
employment since the 1990s. Up until then, urban employment was dominated by
state-sector employment (i.e. employment in “state-owned units”), whether in the
public sector (for example, “government work units”) or in state-owned enterprises
(SOEs). The subsequent rapid increase in urban employment, fuelled by the heavily
subsidized growth of Tibetan towns and cities in the 2000s, was mostly driven by
relatively less privileged and protected private employment, whereas the state sector
was actually shedding jobs in the early 2000s and then only increased employment
slowly later on in the decade. As a result, the state sector’s share of total urban
employment fell rapidly from the late 1990s onwards.
For instance, as shown in Figure 1, total registered urban employment in the
TAR increased from 225,625 people in 2000 to 799,095 by 2014, which was
more than twice as fast as the average growth rate of urban employment in
17 This insight was suggested in discussions with various Tibetan and Chinese scholars. Regarding corrup-
tion in public recruitment, see Zenz 2013, Ch. 5; Hillman 2014.
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China. However, the increase was dominated by burgeoning employment in “pri-
vate enterprises” and self-employment, which increased almost ten-fold in the
TAR, from 48,021 people in 2000 to 473,636 people by 2014. Meanwhile, state
sector employment shrank from a peak of about 170,000 people in 1997 to a
trough of 157,000 employees in 2002, a reduction which was disproportionately
borne by Tibetans, as noted in the introduction.18 State-sector employment then
recovered slowly, relative to the rapid GDP growth of the state sector, reaching
207,267 employees by 2010. It then increased more rapidly to 269,083 by 2014,
although still not as fast as private sources of employment. As a result, the
state sector’s share of total urban employment fell from almost 80 per cent in
the late 1990s to about 34 per cent by 2014.
The retrenchment of state-sector employment was even more severe in China
overall, from a peak of almost 113 million employees in 1995 to a trough of
64 million employees by 2009. However, the decline elsewhere in China was
more than compensated for with an increase in non-state urban units, referring
to non-state formal employment that offers wages, security, benefits and status
on a par with those offered by state-sector employment. In the Tibetan areas,
such employment has remained extremely limited.
Figure 1: Urban Employment, TAR, 1993–2014
Sources:
Calculated from National Bureau of Statistics 2014, tables 4–5, 4–7, Tibet Bureau of Statistics 2015, tables 3–3, 3–4, and equiva-
lent from earlier yearbooks.
Notes:
Numbers of employees on left axis, referring to shaded areas, and percentage shares on right axis, referring to trend lines.
18 See Fischer 2014, Ch. 5, and Fischer and Zenz 2016 for further detail.
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For clarification, urban employment in China is officially defined, registered and
reported according to three broad ownership categories: urban units, private enter-
prises, and self-employment. “Units” in this sense are akin to “private” corporate,
collective/cooperative, or statal entities.19 “Urban unit” employment, also referred
to as “staff and workers,” effectively amounts to a formalized and relatively privi-
leged sub-category of urban employment, with higher wages and greater job secur-
ity than in other forms of urban employment. University graduates primarily target
white-collar “staff” jobs, whether in the public or private sectors.
In contrast, “private enterprise” and self-employment are semi-formal employ-
ment categories, in the sense that they generally lack social security and other
benefits and offer much lower wages on average than urban units (state or non-
state).20 Examples of both include restaurants, small retail shops, internet cafes,
etc. In other words, the “private enterprise” category is not equivalent to the “pri-
vate sector” in that it does not include large corporations and professional
employment in these corporations. We know very little about these categories
in Tibetan areas besides sporadic surveys,21 extrapolation from related statistical
sources,22 and/or qualitative fieldwork. However, as concerns this study, Tibetan
university graduates mostly do not target this space of more informal employ-
ment, or else they only rely on it temporarily while waiting for opportunities to
arise in formal (mostly state) employment.
The dilemma in Tibetan areas is that, until recently, there has been little to
bridge the extremes of privileged state-sector employment and much less privi-
leged and unprotected employment in private enterprise and self-employment.
For instance, only 7 per cent of urban unit employment in the TAR in 2010
was in non-state units, or only 3 per cent of total registered urban employment.23
Similar proportions appear to have prevailed around the same time in other
Tibetan areas. In the two Tibetan autonomous prefectures (TAPs) in Sichuan
province, 83 per cent of urban unit employees in Aba 阿坝 (Tib. Ngawa) and
91 per cent in Ganzi 甘孜 (Tib. Kardze) were employed in the state sector in
2012.24 Even within state-owned units, a reliance on public employment versus
SOEs can be more specifically observed in the Tibetan areas outside of the
TAR from reports issued by various universities on the employment outcomes
of their graduates.25 Likewise, the extremely rare, publicly available SOE
19 These definitions can be found in the China Statistical Yearbooks. See Fischer 2014, Ch. 5 for further
details.
20 Nationally, average wages in private enterprises were about 60% of those in urban units in 2012
(National Bureau of Statistics 2013, tables 4–11 and 4–16). No official wage data have been available
for the poorer informalized categories of urban employment in China, or even for registered private
units in the TAR.
21 For example, Ma and Lhundrup 2008.
22 For example, Fischer 2005; 2014; Yeh and Henderson 2008.
23 Non-state urban unit employment suddenly jumped in 2013 and 2014, although it was unlikely to have
substantially altered the polarized state of affairs for Tibetans. See Fischer and Zenz 2016, 21, for fur-
ther detail and analysis.
24 Calculated from Sichuan Bureau of Statistics 2013, tables 4–7, 4–8.
25 Fischer and Zenz 2016, 23–36; Zenz 2017.
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recruitment documents pertaining to Tibetan areas indicate that Tibetans are
massively underrepresented within these opportunities.26 Tibetan graduates
therefore tend to face an all-or-nothing prospect with respect to public employ-
ment, much more so than elsewhere in China (although similar dynamics also
appear to prevail among other minorities in China).27
The strong increase in public sector hiring from 2011 onwards across most
Tibetan areas is particularly significant in this context given that it effectively
represented – at least in the TAR – the return of full employment for resident ter-
tiary graduates. Indeed, the TAR government claimed in 2014 to have achieved
four consecutive years of such full employment.28 At the end of 2016, it reported
that 84 per cent of TAR resident graduates had been recruited into government
positions from 2011 to 2016.29 This is evidenced for the TAR in Figure 2, which
shows the estimated public sector recruitment figures for each year (based on the
data sources discussed in the next section).30 Estimates of what fenpei recruitment
would have been before it was phased out in 2006 are also included, based on the
numbers of tertiary and secondary vocational (zhongzhuan 中专) graduates in
each year (i.e. the graduates who qualified for fenpei). They are compared to a
measure of annual student intakes of TAR residents in tertiary institutions any-
where in China and an estimate of the annual number of TAR residents gradu-
ating from tertiary institutions anywhere in China.31 The latter graduate measure
is relevant given that public recruitment from at least 2007 onwards has been
explicitly open to all TAR residents who graduated from 2006 onwards, from ter-
tiary institutions anywhere in China, as discussed further below.
26 For instance, we observed this in the 2016 recruitment documents of the TAR branch of the China
National Tobacco Corporation: 40% of all interview candidates were Tibetan (identified on the basis
of names), as opposed to only 17% of those recruited (or 3 recruited out of 20 interviewed). Taken
from “Zhongguo yancao zong gongsi Xizang zizhiqu gongsi guanyu 2016 nian dingxiang zhaopin zong-
chengji de gongshi” (China National Tobacco Corporation TAR branch regarding the public announce-
ment of the 2016 recruitment’s total points results), http://www.xz.hrss.gov.cn/news/2016912/n95802024.
html and http://www.xz.hrss.gov.cn/news/2016912/n26422025.html. Accessed 11 October 2016. Similar
documents from this company’s Qinghai branch likewise suggest a severe underrepresentation of
Tibetans. Also see the study by Maurer-Fazio (2012) on discrimination against Tibetan job seekers in
private companies.
27 See, e.g., Wu and Song 2013; Démurger 2015, 29.
28 “Xizangji yingjie gaoxiao biyesheng lianxu 4 nian quanjiuye” (This year’s TAR resident higher educa-
tion graduates with full employment for the fourth consecutive year), Renmin wang, 7 March 2015,
http://society.people.com.cn/n/2015/0307/c136657-26654444.html.
29 “Xizang zizhiqu gongwuyuanju: xueyu gaoyuan dazao gongwuyuan luqu ‘yangguan pingtai’” (TAR
civil service bureau: the snowy highland creates a civil service recruitment “sunshine platform”),
Xinhuanet, 30 December 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-12/30/c_129426849.htm.
30 The recruitment outcome for the TAR is based on actual data for 2007, but is estimated at 85% of adver-
tisements for 2008–2011 (based on our analysis), and 90% of advertisements from 2012 onwards given
that, from that year onwards, the TAR instituted a second intake round to fill positions left vacant by
the first round.
31 Given the lack of comprehensive data on tertiary graduates from a region at institutions throughout
China, this was estimated based on lagging the above intake numbers for all TAR residents by three
to four years, based on new student intake quotas for BA and associate degrees respectively, and multi-
plied by a factor of 0.9 to account for those who do not complete, or those who continue on to higher
studies.
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According to the recruitment data, the hiring surge in the TAR started in 2011,
peaked in 2012 at 13,050 recruitments, and then settled to about 9,000 by 2016,
slightly less than the initial level reached in 2011. This was up from a trough of
about 4,000 estimated recruitments a year from 2008 to 2010, and a low of 2,338
actual recruitments in 2007. The estimate of the previous fenpei recruitment fig-
ures was in between these two levels, at around 6,000 recruitments a year from
2003 to 2006 (increasing throughout).
Considering the increasing numbers of graduating students during these years, the
resurgence in hiring in 2011 effectively represented a return to the fenpei norm,
except at a higher number of graduating students. Indeed, according to official
sources, the TAR recruited 61,862 graduates into civil and public service positions
from 2011 to 2016, which was more than the number of TAR graduates during that
period.32 Estimated recruitment figures slightly exceeded the number of TAR resi-
dent graduates from 2012 to 2014 (by a significant margin in 2012), which was likely
designed tomake up for the TAR resident graduates who were not hired in the inter-
vening years since the end of fenpei in 2006. In particular, there were far fewer
recruitments than graduates between 2007 and 2010, when the annual number of
graduates was increasing rapidly (reflecting, with a four-year lag, the increased
intakes of students earlier in the decade, before the fenpei was abolished).
Figure 2: Intakes and Graduation of TAR Residents and Public Employment
Recruitment
Sources:
National Bureau of Statistics 2014, table 3–5; Tibet Bureau of Statistics 2000–2016, tables 3–5, 15–6 and 15–7; “Xizang zizhiqu
putong gaodeng xuexiao zhaosheng jihua” (TAR regular higher education intake plan), Xizang jiaoyu kaoshi yuan, various years, http://
www.xzzsks.com.cn; (for fenpei estimate) “Xizang zhizhiqu jiaoyu gaikuang” (TAR education situation) for 2003–2006, n.d., Ministry
of Education, www.moe.edu.cn. See the online supplementary materials for the sources of advertisement data up to the 2015 data.
32 See Xinhuanet 30 December 2016.
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The total number of public sector recruitments between 2007 and 2016 was
nonetheless still less than the number of graduates by around 12,600, in part
owing to a short fall in 2015 and 2016, when recruitments again started to lag
behind new graduates. The neo-fenpei system then appears to have been effect-
ively abandoned in 2017, when public job advertisements dropped suddenly to
5,844, while the estimated number of graduates reached an all time high of
10,757. This observation is supported by official reports that a record number
of 27,500 applicants applied for the 4,551 positions of the first intake in 2017,
along with the conspicuous absence of any reference to the term full “employ-
ment” in official or media statements from the TAR since mid-2016.33 Some
graduates might have been absorbed by employment in SOEs or by sharp
employment increases in non-state urban units for the first time in 2013.34
Indeed, the sudden increase in the latter might have been orchestrated by the gov-
ernment in part to address the looming possibility that the new employment guar-
antee would become difficult to sustain in the face of increasing numbers of
graduates. We might also speculate that the quiet abandonment of the guarantee
in 2017 was related to the transfer of Chen Quanguo, who left the TAR in August
2016 in order to become Party secretary in Xinjiang, and which might have
removed much of the political impetus behind the policy or at least served as
an excuse for back tracking on earlier promises.
As a result of this temporary revival in public hiring, at least in the TAR, the
share of public sector recruitment increased substantially among the respective
age-cohorts concerned.35 For instance, assuming that 90 per cent of advertised
positions were filled, appointments in the TAR in 2015 would have amounted
to almost 17 per cent of the 22-year-old cohort in that year (and a peak of 22
per cent in 2012).36 In comparison, graduate recruitment in the late fenpei period
reached an equivalent ratio of 10 per cent in the peak year of 2006.37 This ratio
collapsed to only 3.7 per cent with the end of fenpei in 2007, and recovered to
only 6 per cent in 2008, which offers some insight into the very austere employ-
ment conditions facing graduates during these transitional years, just before the
outbreak of widespread protests in 2008.
Similar comparisons for the Tibetan regions outside the TAR are rendered dif-
ficult owing to the lack of equivalent data for the late fenpei period. Nonetheless,
the ratio for the Qinghai “Tibetan majority areas” (see next section), for instance,
was close to 17 per cent by 2015, similar to the TAR. Earlier data from 2007 to
2011 also show much lower ratios, suggesting a similar collapse in recruitment
33 “Xizang di yi pi gongkao you 27500 yu ren canjia kaoshi” (TAR first civil service intake exam – 27,500
persons take the exam), Ali Prefecture Government, 21 August 2017, http://www.xzali.gov.cn/discovery/
18130.jhtml. Accessed 17 November 2017.
34 See Figure 1 and Fischer and Zenz 2016, 21–23.
35 Note that these age-cohorts have been successively shrinking since the late 1990s owing to demographic
transition. See Fischer 2008.
36 Based on the five-year cohort averages in the 2010 census. See Tabulation 2012.
37 Calculated based on data from Song, Pubu and Wang 2010, 103.
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levels compared to the fenpei era.38 Indeed, the Qinghai government claimed that
it had achieved a 92.7 per cent employment rate for tertiary graduates across its
Tibetan regions in 2016.39 If true, this indicates that it had also effectively
adopted a neo-fenpei approach, albeit less explicitly, as discussed further below.
Data Sources and Recruitment Processes
The new data sources on government recruitment are related to the routine adver-
tisement of vacancies by local governments (provincial, prefecture or county).
The lists are presented as spreadsheets or tables, entirely in Chinese.40 As first
analysed by Zenz, each advertised post has a separate line in these lists which
contains various amounts of detail but in all cases specifies the required tertiary
degree, the work unit and location as well as additional requirements such as
Tibetan language skills.41 These lists have been posted online starting from
about 2006 onwards. Comprehensive online documentation across all public
job categories began to be available for all provinces containing Tibetan areas
around 2010–2011. Documents initially appear on the government websites of
each region, and then quickly spread across career or news-related media web-
sites. Total numbers of advertised posts can be corroborated with related govern-
ment announcements.
Actual hiring outcomes at one or several stages of the recruitment process are
also increasingly posted online, such as the shortlists for interviews or final
appointments. The level of detail varies widely. Some contain many, even highly
personal details, while others are largely useless for the present analysis because
they do not indicate the minzu status of those recruited. Nonetheless, outcome
documents that do not specify the minzu status of the applicants can still enable
an identification of minorities if they indicate the provision of added points that
only minorities receive.42
For this study, these documents were systematically retrieved for all “Tibetan
Majority Areas” (TMAs), including those outside the TAR (except for Dechen/
Diqing迪庆 TAP in Yunnan because of the poor quality of its published data).43
We have defined a TMA as including any autonomous prefecture or county with
38 This corroborates the fieldwork observations of both authors during this earlier period. See Fischer
2009; 2014; Zenz 2013.
39 “Qinghai zangqu gaoxiao biyesheng jiuyelü da 92.7% chengzhu nian dizeng taishi” (Employment rate of
higher education graduates in Qinghai’s Tibetan regions reaches 92.7 per cent, a gradually increasing
trend), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/micro-reading/2017-03/14/content_28555539.htm. Accessed on
22 March 2017.
40 See the online supplementary materials for a complete set of hyperlinks to the source documents up to
the 2015 data used for the following disaggregated analyses.
41 Zenz 2013.
42 This method is not without problems, as minorities are typically required to register their minzu status
with the examining authority prior to the exam. Nonetheless, the added points column permits a rea-
sonable approximation of results.
43 The term “Tibetan Majority Area” is adapted from Zenz 2013.
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a Tibetan population of more than 50 per cent of the total population.44 The rea-
son for not including other regions with a lower Tibetan population share is to
enable a realistic analysis of Tibetan representation in areas that would have
strong legitimacy in advocating for greater representation in public employment.
The final dataset was compiled by Zenz who parsed more than 20,000 individual
entries, covering almost 110,000 jobs. In rare instances, the analysis required
approximation owing to vague specifications. The complexity of intakes is another
challenge: although intakes are centralized within the TAR, elsewhere they are
often decentralized across jurisdictions and even government departments.
Therefore, except for the TAR, figures for other regions are potentially incomplete,
although based on extensive searches on relevant government and other websites,
we believe that the majority of positions are reflected in our summaries.
Categories of public employment
These recruitment advertisement and outcome documents refer to categories of
public employment in China that can be broadly divided into civil servants (gong-
wuyuan公务员) and public service unit employees (shiye danwei事业单位). Civil
servants are the most prestigious category. They have considerable administrative
powers (xingzheng zhifaquan 行政执法权) and dominate key power positions
such as those within the legal system, law enforcement, inspection bureaus, and
all ministries and government agencies.
The government employment category of public service units refers to public
institutions that provide public services in areas such as education, culture, sci-
ence, health, environmental services or the state media.45 Additionally, various
types of assistant staff positions at core government agencies are also classified
in this category. In contrast to the civil service system, public service unit employ-
ees are directly employed by their respective local public institutions, with the
exception of the TAR, where public service hiring is done at the provincial
level. These positions are also typically lower paid and come with fewer benefits
than civil service posts and have no direct administrative powers.
Another employment category was introduced in 2006 when the Ministry of
Education launched the “Rural volunteer education phase school teachers special
job positions plan,” abbreviated to tegang 特岗.46 The aim of this initiative is to
alleviate teaching staff shortages in China’s less developed western regions.47
44 In Qinghai, this includes the TAPs of Hainan (Tib. Chabcha), Huangnan (Malho), Golog, and Yushu,
and the TACs of Gangca (Gangcha, in Haibei TAP) and Tianjun (Thenchun, in Haixi Mongolian and
Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture). The Tibetan share of the total population of these Qinghai TMAs was
81% according to the 2010 census. In Sichuan, it includes Aba (Ngawa) and Ganzi (Kardze) TAPs. In
Gansu, it includes only Gannan TAP.
45 See also Burns 2007.
46 The full Chinese name is nongcun yiwu jiaoyu jieduan xuexiao jiaoshi teshe gangwei jihua农村义务教育
阶段学校教师特设岗位计划.
47 The TAR never participated in this initiative.
12 The China Quarterly, pp. 1–25
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741017001710
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 80.200.187.247, on 03 Jan 2018 at 12:06:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
The recruitment process
The recruitment process for these public-sector positions consists of two stages.
The first is a written exam (bishi 笔试). Typically, there has to be a minimum
number of applicants who complete the written stage and enter the interview
stage (mianshi 面试), or else the advertised post is withdrawn. In recent years,
such vacant positions are typically re-advertised in subsequent recruitment
rounds. According to our estimates, approximately 80 to 90 per cent of positions
have been filled overall, and the re-advertising of vacant positions has brought
this share closer to 90 per cent.48
Minorities typically receive added points ( jiafen加分) in line with preferential
policies. Points are usually added to either written or interview scores (or both)
and can range from between one and five points, out of a total of 100. In the
TAR, minority applicants do not receive added points but benefit instead from
a lower number of required points ( fenshuxian 分数线), which can be up to 20
points in some cases, depending on the position.
There are generally two types of Tibetan-medium requirement: a Tibetan-
medium tertiary degree (such as for jobs related to the Tibetan language,
Tibetan medicine or Tibetan–Chinese translation), or else some level of
Tibetan language proficiency. The latter requirement is for what is referred to
as “bilingual” positions (shuangyu 双语) in the job advertisements and can
include a wide range, from very weak to very strong language proficiency criteria.
The exam practices also vary, from an interview in Tibetan but all or most of the
written exam in Chinese, to the rare extreme of both the interview and exam
being conducted entirely in Tibetan. A Tibetan-medium degree requirement is
the most restrictive possible requirement and essentially guarantees that the suc-
cessful applicant will be a Tibetan.49
The advertised positions also often specify local residency requirements
(regardless of minzu status). This effectively serves as an implicit form of prefer-
entiality as it prevents more highly educated outsiders, usually Han but also
non-local Tibetans from regions with superior educational opportunities, from
applying for such positions.
Evaluating Public Employment Recruitment Outcomes and Tibetan
Representation
Despite being more limited in coverage than the advertisement documents, the
outcome data provide rare insights into actual Tibetan representation in public-
sector recruitment. For this purpose, we have focused on a sample of 24 outcome
documents that provide sufficient data to analyse minzu identity. These
48 For instance, 84% of the positions advertised in the TAR from 2011 to 2016 were filled, according to the
official sources cited in Fn. 29.
49 See Fischer and Zenz 2016 for further detail.
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documents come from Aba (2 documents, from 2011 and 2013), Ganzi (10 from
2011–2014), the TAR (2 from 2007 and 2008), and the Qinghai TMAs (10 from
2009–2015).50 This sample gives disproportionate weight to Ganzi (31 per cent of
observed outcomes versus a population share of 16 per cent), although the other
regions correspond roughly to their population weight within the remaining
sample. The sample is also temporally imbalanced, particularly in terms of the
TAR, which stopped listing the minzu status of applicants and providing outcome
data after 2008. However, we are confident that it is roughly representative of the
overall outcomes, especially for areas outside the TAR.
Across this dataset, the overall share of Tibetan (or minority) applicants who
were recruited (or shortlisted after the written exam) averaged 69 per cent of the
total. These shares do not reveal any particular pattern across regions, sectors or
years. For instance, by excluding the TAR from the sample, the Tibetan share of
appointments was slightly lower (63 per cent), although this also corresponds to a
slightly lower Tibetan population share than in the TAR. Similarly, both lower
and higher than average shares are observed in the same area and in both civil
service and teacher recruitment.
A representativity ratio can be calculated by normalizing this recruitment share
by the Tibetan (or minority) population share, whereby a ratio of one indicates par-
ity, i.e. a recruitment share that is on par with the population share, a ratio of less
than one indicates underrepresentation, and more than one indicates overrepresen-
tation. If a document only indicates that the applicant is a minority (as opposed to
a Han), the population share of all minorities is used to calculate this ratio.
Accordingly, the representativity ratio of these 24 documents was 0.83, indica-
ting a significant although not severe underrepresentation of Tibetan (or minor-
ity) recruitment in public employment. Actual changes in Tibetan representation
would depend on what was happening to the other unobserved variables, such as
the minzu composition of retirements, layoffs and transfers into and out of the
region. For instance, in the case of the TAR, it is likely that transfers out of
the province are disproportionately non-Tibetan and hence compensate for the
underrepresentation in recruitment. However, all of this is speculative as we can-
not access the relevant data.
Some underrepresentation is to be expected given the marginalized and disad-
vantaged condition of Tibetans and other minorities. Indeed, although strong
preferential policies might seek to redress past underrepresentation, such policies
generally tend to result in lessening the extent of severe underrepresentation (as
observed, for instance, in the 2003 staff and worker data for the TAR, as dis-
cussed above). Conversely, it is also interesting to observe in these data that
there is a certain floor to Tibetan recruitment, irrespective of language preferen-
tiality or residency requirements. In other words, more Tibetans were consistently
recruited than there were job vacancies specifying language, degree-type, or
50 See Table 1 in the online supplementary materials for specific details on these documents.
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residency requirements (with a few exceptions). This is partly explained by the
fact that some Tibetans (such as those graduating from the mainstream
Chinese-medium universities) simply compete well for non-preferential positions,
or else that there is a lack of non-Tibetan competition for certain types of jobs,
especially those in remote areas. Even so, language or residency requirements
generally correspond to higher Tibetan shares of actual appointments.51
Recruitment Advertisements: Language and Residency Requirements
A finer grained and more comprehensive assessment of the institutional practices
of language and residency requirements can be gained from analysing the recruit-
ment advertisements.52 We have normalized the results of the detailed compil-
ation of these advertisements by the general population in order to facilitate
cross-regional comparison, drawing from the 2010 census data. While the recruit-
ment numbers of the TAR were much larger than in other regions, in per capita
terms they were very much within the wider regional norm at the beginning and
end of this nine-year period, as shown in Figure 3. The TAR led the general surge
in hiring by one to three years, in conjunction with the graduate employment
guarantee announced in 2011, as discussed further below. Nonetheless, even
though no other Tibetan area officially established a similar policy, per capita
numbers of advertised vacancies in Ganzi, Amdo Qinghai and Yushu 玉树
reached or exceeded those of the TAR between 2013 and 2015.53 As noted earlier,
there appears to have been an implicit neo-fenpei policy also operating in the
Tibetan areas of Qinghai.
While the reasons behind this recruitment surge are open to speculation, it is
notable that a particularly large share of the increase was in the security sector:
the prison system, legal system (courts, etc.), law enforcement, police forces
(including special police units) and public security.54 Such positions increased
3.3 times between 2011 and 2015 for all regions. They constituted 20 per cent
of all job advertisements in the TAR during these years, 24 per cent in Amdo
Qinghai, 15 per cent in Yushu, 10 per cent in Ganzi and Aba, and 5 per cent
in Gannan 甘南.
51 See Fischer and Zenz 2016 and Zenz 2017 for more detail on the impact of language preferentiality on
Tibetan recruitment oucomes.
52 See Table 2 in the online supplementary materials for a detailed decomposition of these advertisements
by region and type of employment, with an additional subfocus on Tibetan-medium jobs.
53 This was not the case in Gannan in 2015 because local government job allocations were strictly limited
in order to reduce human resource expenses. See “Guanyu quxiao 2015 nian Gannanzhou shiye danwei
zhaopinde tongzhi” (Notice regarding the abolishment of Gannan prefecture’s 2015 public service
recruitment), China Political Education, Gansu subdivision, 14 January 2016, http://www.gshzgwyw.
com/shiyedanwei/zhaokaozixun/20160114/6666.html.
54 In Chinese, fayuan xitong法院系统, sifa xitong司法系统, gong’an jiguan公安机关, renmin jingcha人民
警察, teshu jingcha特殊警察 (or tejing特警), zhifa dadui执法大队, etc. After implementing comprehen-
sive securitization and social control measures in the TAR, Chen Quanguo likewise ordered massive
security-related recruitment in Xinjiang after he became that region’s Party secretary in August 2016.
See Zenz and Leibold 2017.
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Language requirements
Only 12.5 per cent of all advertised positions in all Tibetan areas from 2011 to
2015 required any form of Tibetan language skills (13,551 out of 108,048).
Normalized by Tibetan population shares in order to evaluate the availability
of Tibetan-medium appointments relative to the Tibetan population,55 this
gave a representativity ratio of 0.16, which is quite low considering that minority
language requirements are legally stipulated. Moreover, only 36 per cent of these
Tibetan-medium positions mandated a Tibetan-medium college degree (4,857
advertisements), reflecting the specialized niche role of Tibetan minority educa-
tion in the Tibetan areas of China. Indeed, the number of advertised positions
requiring a Chinese language degree or closely related degrees such as secretarial
studies (wenmi 文秘), at 4,552 advertisements, was only slightly lower than that
for vacancies requiring Tibetan-medium degrees. Teaching dominated the
Tibetan-medium positions,56 whereas the administratively more significant civil
service category was very marginal. The higher Tibetan-medium shares in teach-
ing are understandable considering that Tibetan-language teachers are required
to deliver a Tibetan-medium degree. However, the low shares in the civil service
(and in non-teaching public service) are problematic because these sectors are the
loci where the political and economic significance of the Tibetan language is
ultimately decided.
Figure 3: All Advertised Public Recruitment per 100,000 of the General Population
55 In the case of these Tibetan-medium measures, we only use populations that would normally participate
in Tibetan-medium jobs. Hence, Aba’s Tibetan population share was calculated without the rGyalrong
people (estimated at 125,000 people), whose Qiangic language differs from Tibetan, and who normally
do not participate in Tibetan-medium education.
56 See Zenz 2017 for a detailed overview of language requirements by region.
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Tibetan-medium recruitment shares were nonetheless strongly differentiated by
region. As shown in Figure 4, there was a sharp decline (relative to Tibetan popu-
lation share) in the TAR after 2007 and in Gannan, in contrast to Amdo Qinghai
where the share was consistently high. In terms of five-year averages from 2011 to
2015, only 3.5 per cent of advertised appointments in the TAR had Tibetan-
medium requirements, resulting in a representativity ratio of 0.04. In contrast,
Ganzi and Amdo Qinghai featured average Tibetan-medium shares of 34 per
cent each, resulting in representativity ratios of 0.43 and 0.46. These regional dif-
ferences reflect fundamentally different political attitudes towards the role of the
Tibetan language, with a notable discrepancy between the TAR (and Gannan)
and most Tibetan regions outside the TAR, in particular Amdo Qinghai.
Residency requirements
Residency requirements can restrict local public job allocations to local residents
of either the entire province, the prefecture where the position is advertised, or
even just the county. The fiercest competition for desirable government jobs
often comes from Han or even minorities from regions with stronger educational
foundations.57 Consequently, prefecture residency restrictions offer significant
potential to increase the share of positions allocated to disadvantaged locals
(to the extent that they are not circumvented by corruption, although this possi-
bility has been arguably curtailed by recent anti-corruption campaigns).
Figure 4: Regional Representativity Ratios of All Advertised Tibetan-Medium
Positions
57 See Fischer 2009; 2014, Ch. 6; Zenz 2013, Ch. 5; 2017.
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Residency and language requirements also often overlap. Typically, 60 to 100
per cent of Tibetan-medium positions are restricted to local applicants. This pro-
tects graduates from regions with weaker Tibetan-medium education provision,
although it also prevents the cross-regional transfer of highly skilled Tibetans
across Tibetan regions. Indeed, cross-regional employment was a common phe-
nomenon observed by both authors during fieldwork.
The proportion of advertised recruitments that specified the relevant residency
requirements is shown in Table 1. The tally only includes prefecture-level resi-
dency requirements; it excludes the common provincial residency requirements
outside the TAR since these are not sufficient to protect Tibetans from
non-Tibetan competition in Tibetan areas.
The most striking case is the TAR, which featured a comprehensive shengyuan
requirement from at least the end of the region’s fenpei system up to about 2012.
This requirement restricted almost all advertised positions to applicants who sat
their gaokao 高考 (university entrance examination) in the TAR and who were
TAR residents at the time. This blanket shengyuan requirement has been well
known to applicants and is discussed, for instance, on online forums. An official
TAR news article in June 2015 reminded local secondary school graduates that
they must choose a TAR gaokao location; otherwise, even a TAR resident can
forfeit their right to compete for TAR public employment later on.58 While some-
one could presumably overcome this barrier by changing their residency and tak-
ing their gaokao in the TAR, this would not be an obvious choice for a non-local.
This shengyuan requirement contradicts much of the standard perception that
non-local Han Chinese are prioritized over local Tibetans for such job opportun-
ities. Rather, the restriction would have contributed to the substantial Tibetan
share of public recruitment, which stood at 71 per cent in 2007 and 82 per cent
in the second intake of 2008.59
However, the shengyuan requirement for regular public job appointments has
not prevented the TAR from actively recruiting graduates from other regions.
From about 2012 onwards, the TAR has been increasingly advertising jobs
that target applicants from outside the region, specifically aiming for graduates
with higher degrees (BA and up) and often in specializations such as environmen-
tal engineering that are less common among shengyuan graduates. In 2016, this
development culminated in a total of 1,740 advertised government positions
that were only open to non-residents.60 From our recent discussions (in
November 2017) with several professional Tibetans from the TAR, it appears
that this practice has continued to increase, in contrast to the drop in local
recruitment levels in 2017, as noted previously. It has also been accompanied
by a new practice of organizing job placements outside of the TAR for TAR
58 Wang 2015.
59 See Table 2 in the online supplementary materials for these specific recruitment outcomes.
60 “2016 Xizang mianxiang quwai gaoxiao yinjin rencai 1740 ren gonggao” (TAR announces 1,740 posi-
tions for higher education talents from outside the region), Zhonggong jiaoyu, 1 March 2016, http://sa.
offcn.com/html/2016/03/58514.html. Accessed 7 July 2017.
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(or Tibetan) graduates, with the motivation of creating more inter-ethnic mixing,
at least at this level of privileged public employment.
Outside of the TAR, we can discern basic policy changes in several regions
starting in 2012 (see Figure 5). In that year, Amdo Qinghai introduced residency
requirements for its public service positions, Aba TAP in Sichuan introduced resi-
dency requirements for its civil service positions, and Ganzi TAP in Sichuan
introduced residency requirements for both public and civil service positions.
Gannan started imposing higher shares of civil service residency restrictions in
2013. Given that civil service positions are targeted at higher-skilled applicants,
they had typically been open to applicants from entire provinces, or even from
the whole country. However, by 2014–2015, nearly half of all civil service posi-
tions outside of the TAR carried prefecture-level restrictions (48 per cent in
Table 1: Advertisements with Residency Requirements as Share of All
Advertisements
Region 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2011–2015
average
Amdo Qinghai n/a 27% 17% 51% 33% 39% 37%
Yushu n/a 45% 44% 60% 30% 40% 43%
Aba 58% 42% 41% 25% 54% 46% 51%
Ganzi 34% 18% 25% 41% 46% 23% 37%
Gannan 76% 85% 88% 91% 91% 46% 85%
TAR 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
All regions n/a 86% 80% 82% 82% 69% 79%
All regions (excl. TAR) n/a 53% 41% 56% 55% 35% 48%
Figure 5: Residency Requirement Shares of All Advertisements, All Regions
Excluding the TAR, by Public Employment Category
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2014 and 41 per cent in 2015, compared to only 7 per cent in 2011). These
increases are a sign that local governments of Tibetan-dominated prefectures
are increasingly able (and willing) to meet their human resource needs with locals,
likely as a result of improved educational levels.
The actual impact of local residency requirements can be tentatively gleaned
from four of the sufficiently detailed public recruitment outcome documents
discussed above. Based on only those positions that did not require any
Tibetan-medium requirements, so as to isolate the preferential effect of residency
requirements in the absence of overlapping language requirements, significantly
higher shares of Tibetans (or minorities) were recruited to positions with resi-
dency requirements than to positions without residency requirements. Even
though these few examples cannot be taken as representative, they confirm that
local residency requirements have been associated with higher recruitment out-
come shares for Tibetans. However, a negative side effect of this rising local
labour protectionism is that it impedes Tibetan labour mobility across Tibetan
regions. This development is especially problematic for regions such as Qinghai
where strong Tibetan-medium education coincides with an insufficient local pro-
vision of related employment opportunities.
Conclusion
Several major insights can be made from scrutinizing these available data. Most
importantly, despite almost a decade of ambiguity and uncertainty in the public
employment systems of the Tibetan areas owing to retrenchment and the termin-
ation of fenpei, the surge in public employment recruitment from 2011 onwards
points to the reassertion of the local state as the predominant employment pro-
vider for tertiary-educated Tibetan millennials. Indeed, following this surge, a
much larger share of the university-aged population was recruited than during
the late fenpei period.
Tibetan representation within the surge did not collapse. However, Tibetans
were underrepresented in new appointments made across all Tibetan areas in
China from 2007 to 2015, at an average of about 83 per cent of what would
be parity with their population share, and without any significant patterns across
regions or time. More information would be needed on the minzu composition of
people exiting from public employment for a more holistic evaluation of the evo-
lution of Tibetan representation. Even so, we can be confident in suggesting that
the exercise of preferentiality through language or residency requirements signifi-
cantly bolstered representation. Indeed, it is likely that a combination of policies
within the surge would have maintained or even increased Tibetan representa-
tion, although we do not have access to sufficient data to evaluate this
speculation.
The sustained and in some cases increasing use of residency requirements in
particular, in contrast to the decline in language requirements, suggests a gener-
ally assimilationist continuity of minority policy from the Hu–Wen to the Xi–Li
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administration, together with the reinforced emphasis of security and social sta-
bility (weiwen维稳) under the latter. This implies that the continuation of certain
forms of minority preferentiality is seen as important for maintaining stability in
minority regions, particularly in response to rising tensions such as those asso-
ciated with the outbreak of large-scale protests in 2008 and the wave of self-
immolations that gained momentum in 2011. The fact that a large portion of
appointments were in security-related positions certainly supports this suggestion,
given that these appointments aim to both absorb the labour reserves of young
Tibetan graduates, who would otherwise be prone to political agitation, while
at the same time using them to police their own people. Similarly, the use of
local residency requirements for civil service jobs outside the TAR might be, in
part, a means to engineer a stronger spatial fixing in the career trajectories of
such Tibetans. The recruitment surge more generally reflects a recognition that
an adequate supply of appropriate employment for minority graduates is central
to securing social stability and that well-remunerated private employment in the
Tibetan areas remains starkly inadequate, with local Tibetans severely disadvan-
taged when competing for the little that is available.
This is especially the case in the TAR, where the re-guarantee of graduate
employment in 2011 led to a unique although temporary system that we term
neo-fenpei, which was introduced at a critical time when the state was focused
on pacifying and increasing the policing of the local population. This was pre-
ceded by what seems to have been a seamless transition from a fenpei system
to a system of local residency requirements, with the comprehensive specification
of local “origin” (shengyuan) in government posts. The neo-fenpei system had the
same effect of guaranteeing employment for such graduates, but within a radic-
ally new context in which such public-sector employment only accounts for a
minority of total urban employment, whereas it dominated urban employment
during the fenpei period. Hence, whereas fenpei was an equalizing force within
urban areas (although not across urban and rural areas), the neo-fenpei system
became a strong source of segmentation and differentiation within the emerging
urban employment system. It did this by accentuating university education as a
gateway to privilege, at least for the brief generation of Tibetans who graduated
just before or during its tenure. Given the much lower schooling attainments in
rural areas, this would presumably have had the effect of also maintaining the
strong differentiation between urban and rural areas that was characteristic of
the earlier fenpei system, albeit through different, more competitive mechanisms.
The way in which these developments might be related to the influence of the
advocates for a second generation of ethnic policies (SGEP) is somewhat compli-
cated. The decline in the use of language requirements (with the exception of
Amdo Qinghai), especially in the TAR, would appear to be in harmony with
their push to phase out minzu-based preferentiality and replace it with regionally
targeted allocations of state support based on regional socio-economic dispar-
ities. Similarly, the use of residency requirements might appear in line with
such regionally based prioritization. However, it runs counter to the SGEP
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advocates’ defence of labour mobility: they would be at odds with the substitu-
tion of minzu identity politics with what they might deem as “local protection-
ism” that restricts competition from outsiders. We therefore expect tension and
contestation with many of these trends at the national level of politics. Tension
and contestation are also likely to occur at local levels as many of these develop-
ments represent the entrenchment of assimilationist trends in education and
employment policies (again, with the exception of Amdo Qinghai, where the evo-
lution of recruitment policy reflects a less bluntly assimilationist approach to
minority policy).
As such, the neo-fenpei system (and its approximates in Tibetan areas outside of
the TAR) contains many contradictory dynamics. It serves the overarching pur-
pose of promoting weiwen by prioritizing the employment of relatively elite
cohorts of Tibetan millennials but in a way that simultaneously tones down
minzu language requirements (except in Amdo Qinghai). However, although pref-
erential towards residents of disadvantaged regions, the neo-fenpei system is not
necessarily preferential towards people of lower socio-economic status within
these regions, as SGEP advocates would prefer. Rather, it seems to represent a
discrete shift towards implicit rather than explicit ways of exercising preferentiality
towards minorities, in ways that enhance intra-Tibetan competition and benefit
Chinese-medium educated Tibetans. This assimilationist pressure would nonethe-
less be in harmony with the SGEP position, in that assimilation is argued to be the
ultimate means for achieving better social integration and stability among mino-
rities, a view that appears to be endorsed by the Xi–Li administration.
In this sense, these developments reveal the tensions of the SGEP position with
the competing governance objectives of maintaining social stability and also
more generally with the challenges of practising preferentiality in contexts of
minority disadvantage. In the latter case, the government probably conceives
of preferentiality as primarily addressing inter-group rather than intra-group dis-
parities. The criticism of such an approach is that it tends to be elitist within the
disadvantaged group (Tibetans), as is a common charge laid against affirmative
action and other preferential policies in different parts of the world. However,
this criticism arguably misconceives the purpose of such policies. As evidenced
by the Tibetan case studied here, their purpose is to increase the representation
of the disadvantaged groups in positions of social, political and economic influ-
ence, which are generally only accessed by elites of all groups in any case.
Whether or not the particular ways of doing this in the Tibetan context in
China actually lead to Tibetan empowerment remains a hotly contested topic
in both Tibetan and Chinese intellectual circles. Tibetans in particular often
contest the assimilationist and instrumentalist orientation of such preferential
policies whereby feigned benevolence actually operates as a technology of
state control and often oppression. Indeed, this subaltern perspective is counter-
intuitive with the conventional wisdom that preferential policies necessarily
enhance the empowerment of the targeted groups, as is assumed by SGEP advo-
cates. The fact that they might not, in their current mutations in the Tibetan areas
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of China, points towards how such policy dynamics might well continue to aggra-
vate grievances among new generations of Tibetans for the foreseeable future.
Supplementary Material
To view supplementary material for this article, please visit https://doi.org/10.
1017/S0305741017001710.
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摘要: 根据一组完全没有被研究过的原始数据, 本文分析了 2007 年至 2015
年之间, 整个藏族地区公职人员招聘中藏族的代表比例和优待的演变。虽
然在 2000 年代早中期工作分配制度结束后, 招聘一度瓦解, 2011 年以后公
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职人员招聘又有强劲增长。藏人在这波增长中没有被充分代表, 但是并不
严重。各种隐性的优待招聘实践还增加了这种代表比例, 在不同的地区和
时间有明显的区别。这种组合重申了国家在受教育的千禧一代的就业中的
主导地位, 以至于到了重新引入就业保障的地步。我们把此种创新称为新
分配制度, 这种情形在西藏自治区最为明显。相对于它的前身, 新分配的一
个效应就是它强调了大学教育在新兴城市就业中作为划分的驱动因素。这
些招聘实践的演变显示了习李政府强调的安全和维稳的总体目标在藏族地
区的复杂的张力 ——它虽然保持了少数民族优待的制度, 却在某种意义上
强化了藏族的被同化而不是少数民族的自主性。
关键词: 关键词汇; 西藏; 中国; 公职人员招聘和改革; 民族代表; 优待政策
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